

SECRET

SE/2-B-62-34

15 December 1961

MEMORANDUM/15

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, SE/2

SUBJECT : Security Review - ☐

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1. The purpose of this paper is to review the ☐ case and to make recommendations regarding its further development or termination. Please see paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the ☐ evaluation since they serve as background data for this case as well.

2. As of December 1961, a total of 6 SW messages had been received; the last was postmarked 1 June 1960. The correspondence from ☐ is as follows :

a. ☐ Message No. 1 postmarked 5 April 1959. Indicators clean. The message evidenced a joint effort with ☐ (KIPA-26529, 18 May 1959).

b. Message No. 1 postmarked 28 May 1959. Indicators clean.

c. Message No. 2 postmarked 7 August 1959. Indicators clean. ☐ gave his father-in-law's name as his new accommodation address: ☐

d. Message No. 3 postmarked 17 September 1959. Indicators clean.

e. Message No. 4 postmarked 6 January 1960. Indicators clean. ☐

f. Message No. 5 postmarked 29 March 1960. Indicators clean. Once more ☐ referred to his sister-in-law and made additional mention of her husband whom he felt could be exploited.

g. Message No. 6 postmarked 1 June 1960. The message gave a ☐ Roughly 1/3 of the message was illegible.

A total of 4 KUBARK SW messages have been sent to ☐ to date. ☐

3. With the advent of ☐ on the scene a new facet of possible RIS involvement in the ☐ case looms ahead. If ☐ is controlled, as there are grounds to suspect, the RIS has tried to revitalise the operation by introducing ☐ into the picture. She was signalled to us in ☐ SW Message No. 4 and again in SW Message No. 5. KUBARK did not succeed in contacting her prior to her visit ☐

Actually little definitive information has been gleaned by MOG on her activities during that visit. Unfortunately ☐ through a mix-up in pictures (a picture of Boris GRANOVSKIIS was shown to her instead of one of her alleged brother-in-law, ☐ and a too candid discussion of AIS interest in ☐ SW Messages No. 2 and 4 were shown to her and her husband) has become privy to the case as something more than a "need to know" basis. Moreover, her husband remains a shrewd but unknown quantity whose careful monitoring of ☐ contact with AIS

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needs resolution. KUBARK has just learned that his parents and a sister reside in Washington, D. C. Having discouraged a REDSKIN trip by [ ] in July and again in November 1961, KUBARK is still not certain of her bona fides or whether [ ] is a witting or unwitting tool of the RIS. Even a recent LCPLUTTER raises some skepticism due to her sensitivity about RIS connections. The question of [ ] trip to [ ] will arise again in the Spring of 1962. It seems that this time she will [ ] [ ] regardless of what KUBARK suggests. At this point she knows enough of AIS modus operandi, plans, personnel, etc. so that wittingly or possibly under RIS pressure she could reveal information compromising [ ] if he is still uncontrolled, a fact which seems doubtful. On the premise that [ ] is not RIS, the Soviet government, at a crucial time when pressure is being put upon the neutral states of Europe, i.e. Finland, Sweden, and Austria, could create embarrassment for [ ] relations by publicizing AIS recruitment of a neutral national for espionage. When and if [ ] does go [ ] KUBARK may glean better insight into the [ ] case although the results may well not be to our satisfaction or without repercussions.

4. The "take" from [ ] reports has been fruitless to date.

5. Recommendations :

It is recommended that the [ ] case be continued until such time as the [ ] case is resolved. Admittedly, the rather loose way by which AEMARSH/15 originally contacted [ ] has left many openings for RIS penetration. The possibility of [ ] who recruited and trained [ ] being under KGB suspicion as a consequence of the lost notebook, or his being compelled to uncover [ ] is a very real concern which further clouds the [ ] picture.

COB Frankfurt has taken a strong stand that the [ ] operation be dropped as an unproductive and uncontrollable operation. I agree with him although I suggest that we attempt to resolve all outstanding possibilities or potential security implications. MOG obviously has no interest in this case at present and this has been amply evidenced of late. To continue this operation appears to be simply to take the course of least resistance rather than an honest operational decision. The background of this case and the personalities involved are amorphous and offer little in the way of operational potential.

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